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Introduction 
The Dakota Proposition, an initiated proposal to amend the South Dakota State 
Constitution, will appear on the 1980 ballot. The Proposition would seem to have 
far reaching implications. Yet, what are these implications? Will the Proposition 
be a boon to taxpayers, a calamity for government, or both? 
Three major provisions are included in the Proposition. These are: 
I. A reduction or rollback of taxes on real property to one percent of Full and 
True value, determined by assessments performed in 1977; 
2. A ceiling of two percent annual growth in the Full and True value of real 
property for any year during which inflation exceeds two percent. Inflation would 
be measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), an official calculation of general 
consumer price changes in the U.S. economy; 
3. A two-thirds vote requirement for both houses of the state legislature on 
any tax increases, and specific prohibition of legislative changes in real property 
taxes or of a tax on the sale of real property. 
This paper involves an examination of the likely economic impacts and impli-
cations of the first two major provisions, the rollback and the ceiling on growth 
of the bases, and additional analyses to assist readers in making informed decisions 
about the Dakota Proposition. 
Rollback Provision 
Figures from the South Dakota Department of Revenue reveal that real property 
taxes payable in 1978 (including taxes on utility property) were approximately $195. 9 
million.1 If the Dakota Proposition had been in effect in 1978, however, taxes on 
real property would have been limited to one percent of the Full and True value as 
assessed in 1977. Instead of paying $195.9 million in taxes on real property, real 
property owners would have paid approximately $95.6 million, a savings for taxpayers 
lAnnual Statistical Report FY 1978, South Dakota Depar �ent of Revenue, 
Pierre, p. 28. 
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and a revenue loss for local governments of about $100 million or more than fifty 
2 percent. 
Over the past five years, property taxes in South Dakota have increased at an 
average annual rate of seven percent. If property taxes were to continue to in-
crease at the same rate, by 1981 (the proposed year for initiating the Dakota 
Proposition), real property taxes would total approximately $240 million. The 
Dakota Proposition would, however, rollback real property taxes to about $101.5 
million, creating a reduction in tax revenues of $138.5 million or about 58 percent.3 
of the Rollback 
Agricultural and non-agricultural properties in South Dakota are treated dis-
tinctly for purposes of taxation to support elementary and secondary schools. The 
first eight mills required to fund local school budgets are applied equally to 
agricultural and non-agricultural properties; for rates above eight mills, non-
agricultural land is taxed at two mills for every one mill on agricultural property, 
up to a ceiling of twenty four mills for agricultural and forty mills for non-agri-
cultural property.4 
In effect, non-agricultural properties are, in general, taxed at a higher 
percentage of their assessed value. But again, the Dakota Proposition would limit 
the rate of taxation to one percent of Full and True value without respect to agri-
cultural non-agricultural differences. This limit has two related consequences--
2.california's experience with Proposition 13 suggests that an ex� legal 
challenge to the Full and True assessments of 1977 might, however, arise. Such a 
challenge would involve an attempt to raise Full and True assessments to reflect 
actual market values. If the Full and True values for 1977 are adjusted by the 
average assess�ent to sales ratio for South Dakota in 1977 (79.7%) the values in­
crease by twenty percent. Thus real property taxes (excluding utilities) would have 
been rolled back to $116 million, rather than $95.6 million. Taxpayers would have 
saved $63.7 million and local units of government would have lost about thirty-five 
percent of revenues from real property taxes. Sales ratio figures are from: 1977 
South Dakota Assessment and Sales Information, Property Tax Division, Department of 
Revenue, Pierre, South Dakota. 
3This projection assumes no ex post adjustment in the Full and True value assess­
ment of 1977. 
4This ceiling does not apply to bond redemption levies. 
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tax savings created would be more substantial for non-agricultural real property 
owners than for agricultural real property owners; and, local governments in more 
urbanized counties would lose a greater percentage of their revenues than would 
local governments in more agricultural counties. 
Table I illustrates rollback consequences for agricultural and non-agricultural 
property owners in 1978. Had the Dakota Proposition been put into effect in 1978, 
real property taxes for agricultural lands and lots would have been reduced, on the 
average, by 30.0 percent. But property taxes on non-agricultural lands and lots 
would have been reduced, on the average, by 63.2 percent. 
TABLE I* 
Impact of Dakota Proposition: Ag Non-ag Property (1978) 
Type of Property 
Agricultural 
Lands 
Lots 
Total 
Non-agricultural 
Lands 
Lots 
Total 
Taxes Payable(S) 
73,993,317 
�'?_3,107 
74,246,424 
6,229,580 
99,241,632 
105,471,212 
$179,717,636 
With the Dakota 
Pro.E_osition ($) Difference 
51,955,038 22,931,386 
38,803,261 66,667,951 
$90,758,299 $88,959,337 
($) Change 
-30.0% 
-63.2% 
-49.5% 
* Source of data is South Dakota Department of Revenue, Annual Statistical Report, 
FY 1978. 
Counties with relatively more non-agricultural properties are, by definition, the 
more urbanized counties of the state. Table II lists South Dakota counties and shows 
the absolute and percentage decline in annual real property tax revenues which local 
governments in the counties would �ave experienced had th� Dakota Proposition taken 
effect in 1978.5 Note that one agricultural county, Sull)·, would have experienced a 
tax increase. 
5Appendix I shows county impacts given an ex post adjr,:-,tment of Full and True value· 
for 1977 using the "all average" assessment-sales ratios, by county, 1977. 
Impact of the 
�-� 
Aurora 
Beadle 
Bennett 
Bon Homne 
Braakints 
Bro\tn 
Brule 
Buffalo 
Butte 
Campbell 
Charles Hix 
Clark 
Chy 
Codington 
Corson 
Custer 
Davison 
Day 
Deuel 
De.,ey 
Douglas 
Edmunds 
Fall River 
Shannon 
Faulk 
Grant 
Gregory 
Baakon 
Hamlin 
Hand 
Hanson 
l!ardbg 
v 
Hughes 
Hutchinson 
Hyde 
Jackson 
Washabaugh 
Jerauld 
Jones 
lingsbury 
Lake 
Lawrence 
Lincoln 
Lyi:aan 
McCook 
McPhci:son 
Marshall 
Meade 
Mellette 
M.inei: 
Minnehaha 
Moody 
.Ft!un.1ng,::on 
Pei:kins 
Potter 
Roberts 
Sanborn 
Spink 
Stanley 
Sully 
Tripp 
Todd 
Turner 
llnton 
Wa lwilrth 
Y.anktiln 
Ziebach 
!.:ital 
Averagt>S 
Per County 
TABLE II 
Dakota Prop<JSi tiun By County 
De-crease (or Inc re.ise) 
1n T.J:< 'Revenut•:i {$} 
429,505. 77 
3,496,457.27 
527,28).19 
l,209,70S.l2 
),259,553.46 
6,666,)62. 71 
660,685. 77 
11,558. 70 
1,241,218.61 
206,591.10 
1,115,899.15 
550,999.85 
1,752,652.86 
3,202,150.80 
210,968.16 
783.217.70 
3,225,957.80 
1,127,304.05 
834,)45.20 
197,196.)3 
385,564.35 
750,273.25 
1,152,24).50 
63,770.91 
409, 767. 96 
1,805,276.78 
947,081.53 
301,931. 72 
643,283.07 
619,085.74 
513,895.96 
428,148.26 
2,106,228.44 
t,481,177.43 
88,321.14 
85,234. 74 
2,251.95 
350,670.18 
331,678.61 
927,833.38 
1,435, 107. 79 
3,930,182.92 
1,711,637.69 
358,742.52 
895,524.04 
603,610.94 
572,352. 73 
1,579,922.58 
813,401.95 
550,569.35 
18,914,970.36 
934,293.16 
12,248,521.96 
126,327.27 
330,767.39 
1,421,977.42 
524,486.31 
1,127,847.73 
430,453.16 
(26,970.54) 
795,177.41 
178,%0.17 
1,031,553. 88 
t,799,148.18 
1,213,54 ) ... J 
3,180.095.JS 
95,693.69 
100,256,�82.68 
1,496,365.41 
( 1978) 
Percentage �ecre�se 
� Incre.,se) I�) 
37 
58 
62 
54 
54 
56 
43 
05 
49 
26 
46 
34 
50 
59 
17 
56 
69 
45 
51 
29 
38 
37 
57 
38 
30 
42 
50 
32 
43 
31 
48 
48 
49 
49 
11 
19 
01 
38 
55 
42 
54 
67 
45 
25 
47 
38 
36 
52 
29 
48 
60 
44 
63 
08 
25 
53 
48 
36 
40 
(02) 
34 
38 
41 
34 
51 
39 
16 
41 
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.Study of Table II reveals that� in general, real property tax reductions 
for IDore rural counties would have be.en less than for more urban counties. Yet� 
t:her-e are -exceptions. Among the more rural counties of the state, for example� 
Bennet County would have had a reduction of 62 percent - a greater percentage 
reduction than either Minnehaha or Brown County. 
A second explanation for the difference in impact among counties lies in 
t:ax rate differences.  Those counties which tax property at a higher mill levey 
rate would have a greater reduction in revenues with Dakota Proposition. Two 
c,ounties might even have property of equal m�Itet value and might obtain equal 
tax revenues. Yet if assessed values and mill rates differed, that county 
with a lower assessed value (and higher mill rates) would be more affected by 
Dakota Proposition than would the county with a higher assessed value (and 
l,ower mill rates). 
Thus Table II reveals that those counties �hich have the highest tax rates 
(highest mill levies relative to assessed values) would be most affected by 
"Dakota Proposition. Having a high tax rate may reflect: (1) a high proportion 
of nonagricultural real property relative to agricultural property; (2) a strategy 
of keeping assessments low and mill levies high; or, (3) simply a willingness to 
:impose a relatively high tax rate to yield revenues for desired services. 
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Growth Ceiling Provision 
A second major provision of the Dakota Proposition is the creation of a ceiling 
on changes in the assessed value of real property subsequent to the Full and True 
assessment of 1977. Changes in assessed value would be tied to a measure of prices 
paid by consumers, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) . 
Assessed values for real property could change on an annual basis in direct 
proportion to changes in CPI (either positive or negative changes), except that if 
the CPI rose by more than two percent, assessed value growth �ould be limited to two 
percent only. Since the CPI will almost inevitably rise by more than two percent 
annually, for the forseeable future, this provision will efectively limit growth 
in assessed real property values to less than the rate of general consumer inflation. 
Prices paid for state and local government purchases in recent years have, how-
ever, been rising at a rate above the CPI. Rapid increases in governme�t purchase 
prices reflect both general inflation in the economy and supply-demand conditions 
wl1ich increase the prices for particular products. For example, government units, 
as large purchasers of petroleum products, would be significantly affected by price 
increases resulting from crude oil shortages. 
One measure of prices paid by state and local governments is the GNP Deflator 
for State and Local Purchases. The Deflator reveals, for example, that from 1967 
to 1978, prices paid by state and local governments for purchases increased by 121.4 
percent. The CPI increase for the corresponding period of time was 95. 4 percent. 
Implications of the growth ceiling provision can be v:Lewed in a series of two 
graphs. Graph #1 shows that the nominal growth in property taxes collected in South 
Dakota during the period 1970 through 1977 was 55. 6 percen:. If the Dakota Propositio� 
had been in effect during that period, however, growth in property taxes would have 
6 been limited to 14. 9 percent. 
Nominal changes do not involve any consideration of t:;2 impact of inflation, 
however, Graph #2 incorporates the effect of inflation on tax revenues by deflating 
6Nominal per capita personal income grew in South Dako:a by 91. 7 percent during 
the same period. 
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revenues through the use of the CPI. If the change in property taxes collected 
from 1970 through 1977 is calculated in 1970 dollars, so as to reveal changes the 
actual purchasing power of property taxes collected, such purchasing power was reduced 
by 0. 5 percent. 7 The nominal growth in property tax virtually kept pace with general 
inflation so that the dollars in revenue collected in 1977 could purchase approximately 
the same amount of goods in 1977 as in 1970. 1£ the Dakota Proposition had been in 
effect during that period, however, the purchasing power of property taxes collected 
(as adjusted by the CPI) would have declined by 41. 2  percent. 
GROWII·I LIMITATiml' PROVISION 
Percent 
change l 
+50% 
1970 
Graph Ul: Nominal 
A 
-------B (+14.9%) 
.?:::-:.-:::::::· 19 7 7 · 
-50% T 
A= Nominal Property Tax Collected 
B � Maximum growth w/ Dakota Proposition 
Percent 
change 
+50% 
1970 
-50% 
Graph 02: Real 
D (-41.2%) 
Cc Real Property Tax Collected 
D c Real 2'1axi;:ium Growth w/ Dakot.:i. 
Proposition 
Recall, however, that prices paid for purchases by state and local government 
have exceeded the general rate of inflation for consumer purchases. Thus the analysis 
of the loss of purchasing power as measured by the CPI results is a conservative 
estimate. If  the change in property taxes collected between 1970 and 1977 is ad-
justed by the GNP Deflator a 12. 5 percent,decline in purchasing power is revealed. If 
the Dakota Proposition had been in effect during that same period, however, the pur-
chasing power of property taxes collected (as adjusted by the GNP Deflator) would 
have declined by 53. 2 percent. 
7During the same period, the purchasing power of per capita personal incomes in 
South Dakota increased by 22. 8 percent. 
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The conclusion of this analysis of the growth ceiling provision is that if, 
as .expected, general inflation significantly exceeds two percent annually� this 
provision would create a significant and continuous decline in the purchasing power 
of the real property tax in South Dakota. Any price increases over and above general 
lnflation for purchases made by state and local governments would further reduce the 
purchasing power of the property tax. 
Additional Implications of the Pro2osition 
A number of additional implications of the Dakota Proposition exist--both for 
the :public and private sectors . 
.Public Sector--State and Local 
7he passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 resulted in massive state aid 
to local governments. Such aid is unlikely in South Dakota, given the minimal state 
surplus and the estimated size of the rollback amount relative to the total state budget. 
:Marked jncreases in state aid would requjxe additional state taxes. 
At the local government level, elementary and secondary schools will be the 
'l!Ilits of government most adversely affected by reductions in property tax revenues. 
7able TII revels that the 1978 property tax was distributed in such a way that primary 
.and secondary schools received almost two thirds of the revenues obtained. Moreover, 
schools in South Dakota obtain approximately 70 percent of their finances from the 
local property tax, so that the quantity and quality of primary and secondary education&" 
services depend heavily on property tax revenues. 
Table III 
Tiistribution of South Dakota Property Tax Revenues (1978) 
Local Government Units 
Schools 
Counties 
Cities and Towns 
Townships and Sp. Districts 
Source: Department of Revenue Annual Report FY 1978, p. �·· 
Percent 
63.11 
20.61 
13.89 
2.39 
100.00 
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Schools also do not have the ability to charge user fees or to enact new taxes. 
General purpose governments, in contrast, would have the ability and the incentive, 
given property tax reductions, to charge or increase fees for goods and services 
such as trash collection, water, building inspection, parks, sewage disposal, etc. 
Cities in South Dakota would also have the incentive and the ability, with voter 
approval, to enact or to increase municipal sales taxes. 
Private Sector 
Additional implications in the private sector may be traced as well. Land owners 
would be more likely to construct or repair homes and other improvements since the 
disincentive to improving property created by the property tax would be lessened. 
Current land owners would reap the windfall of the roll back and the expected 
reduction in future property taxes. The windfall could be taken either as a reduced 
tax burden with continued ownership or capitalized into the sales price of property. 
Passage of the Dakota Proposition, other things equal, would mean that prices for 
land would tend to increase. Prices for homes and other imporvements are likely to 
rise initially, then decline again as increased supplies of capital drive prices 
dovmward. 
Purchasers of services provided by investor-owned utilities would likely find 
their monthly bills for electricity, gas, or telephone had fallen. Regulated utilities 
have rates set relative to their costs of business so that decreased taxes are likely 
to be passed along as decreased rates for consumers. 
Values and Trade-Offs 
Values, our sense of the goodness and badness of pers�,1s, events, and things, 
will influence our decisions about the Dakota Proposition End about taxation and 
government activities in general. It is important to recornize that the decision 
about how to react to the Dakota Proposition and to taxati0 a and government in South 
Dakota can involve an objective examination of our own vnLes and the values of others. 2 
8By an objective examinntion is meant one that is cohc �nt and clear, one open to 
critique by others, and one which results in decisions whi :i appear to have been right. 
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Burdensome Nature of Property Tax 
Two corrnnonly held values are likely to prompt citizens to support the Dakota 
Proposition. First, some citizens may regard the property tax in South Dakota as 
too burdensome. Indeed, statistics may be cited to support this view. In South 
Dakota in 1975, for example: the property tax was $57 per $1000 of personal income, 
placing the state seventh among all states; the property tax was $491 per $1000 of 
state and local revenue (fifth among all states); state aid was $249 per $1000 of 
local revenue (!-.8th among all states and thereby implying that other states rely 
relatively more on sales and income taxes); state and local taxes were $116 per 
$1000 income (29th among all states and implying that the total tax burden was not 
unusual in South Dakota even while the dependence on the property tax was unusually 
high).9 
But although the Dakota Proposition would significantly reduce the property 
tax burden in South Dakota, other potential consequences should also be considered. 
For that individual who holds the view that the property tax is too burdensome, 
these other potential consequences are likely to be regarded as undesirable. These 
consequences would becowe trade-offs if the individual decided to support the Pro-
position. 
Approval of the Dakota Proposition would increa3e the probabili0: (not make 
inevitable) some combination of a loss of local control, a loss of desired programs 
or levels of services, or an addition to state taxes. 
Consider first the probability of a loss of local control. If state and national 
governments are called upon to suppo.rt local government uni.ts which have sustained 
9All statistics were gatherd from ''Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 
1976-77 Edition: Vol. II Revenue and Debt," Advisory Commission in Intergovernmental 
Relations, Washington, D.C. 20575, March 1977. Elimination of approximately one 
fifth of the property tax through the personal property tax repeal will reduce the 
burden of the total property tax per se. 
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substantial revenue losses, that support is likely to involve guidelines, require-
ments, and other "strings" on how money may be spent. Moreover, substantial aid 
from the state could not be made without a new state tax program--probably an income 
tax; the only common and major tax method not used in the state. 
If, in contrast, local governments attempt to sustain very large reductions in 
revenues without assistance from the state, the quantity or quality of some programs 
such as elementary and secondary education would be jeopardized. Although the 
Dakota Proposition, if passed would rollback real property tax revenues to approx-
imately the 1969 level, general inflation as measured by the CPI has reduced the 
value of the 1979 dollar to only about half of the 1969 dollar; purchasing power 
of revenues is greatly reduced.10The argument, sometimes heard, that passage of the 
Dakota Proposition would only result in a reduction of local services back to the 
1969 level ignores inflation and the decrease in revenue purchasing power subsequent to 
1969. 
Inequity of the Property Tax 
A second value behind the move to approve t:he Dakota Proposition may well be 
the belief that the property tax is an inequitable tax. If ability of pay is measured 
11 by income, the property tax is not necessarily tied to ability to pay� A common 
example used by those who hold that the property tax is inequitable is the retiree 
whose income is reduced by retirement but whose property tax remains at the same level. 
The property tax may also tax equal income earners uneg�ally. Two neighbors 
with equal incomes but with different consumption patterns are likely to be taxed 
unequally--that individual who prefers to own real property would likely pay more 
property tax than that individual who prefers to own persor�_:31 property. 
lOMoreover, the cost of education and other publically vrovided services, tends 
to rise relatively faster than the prices of other goods because cost reducing 
technologic;al innovations are less prevelant in education o,.· other public 
services than in goods in general. 
11some would measure ability to pay by wealth. Since �.e property tax is a tax 
on wealth held in cert�in kinds of property, the real property tax would be tied 
to the ability to pay if ability were measured by wealth. 
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Finally, the property tax often is not tied to benefits received. Through 
tax contributions to public education, for example, families with real property but 
without children help subsidize famili.es with children. 12 
For those individuals, however, who support the Dakota Proposition because they 
hold the view that the property tax is inequitable, some likely trade-offs resulting 
from passage of the proposition should be considered. If local public programs 
reduced by the loss of local revenues, those reductions may themselves result in 
what some would view as inequities. Quantity or quality of educational programs, 
assistance to the needy, and programs for the elderly might all be threatened. More-
over, if program reductions are avoided by the passage of new tax measures, those 
new sales taxes, income taxes, or user charges will not necessarily be more equitable 
than the property tax itself. 
Conclusion 
The so-called "tax payer rebellion, " a movement which has taken on national 
dimensions, is manifesting itself in South Dako�a in proposals such as the D2kota 
Proposition and various other attempts to limit or reduce taxpayer outgo and government 
income. Such proposals create the opportunity and indeed the responsibility to reexamin 
what the state and local governments do and how government is financed in South Dakota. 
Our state has a unique tax system--one that is heavily dependent on the local 
property tax, one that involves relatively small contributions from the state to 
local governments, and one that does not utilize a major tax option--the state in-
come tax. Tax systems require reevaluation as social and economic conditions change. 
Should government services in South Dakota be reduced? Should counties have a sales 
tax option? Should the state have an income tax to reduce the property tax burden 
12It should be noted, however, that many local public services, including education, 
create benefits which extend beyond the direct recipients of those services. For 
example, public education creates benefits not only for a child and his family, but 
for the whole community, through a better educated populace. 
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and/or increase support for local governmental units such as schools? Should the 
property tax be redesigned so that limits are placed on amounts of tax liability 
relative to personal income? These questions are ours to answer as citizens of this 
state because ultimately, the quality of government decisions is dependent upon our 
willingness to be informed and involved. 
